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Finding a "Fit":
Gene Patents and Innovation Policy
by ERICA L. ANDERSON*
I. Introduction
Public policy inherently involves the analysis and comparison of
collective social values and normative goals. It should also include
consideration as to which institution is best suited to implement
policy objectives.' Attention to determinative responsibility and to
the comparative strengths and weaknesses of alternative institutions
promotes enhanced realization and increases the likelihood of
achieving policy objectives.2 Any given institution may "fit" a policy
objective because each institution has some policymaking power,
however, that general "fit" may not be the best.3 Therefore, in a
multi-institutional analysis, the question is "is this the best fit?" The
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012; B.A.,
Claremont McKenna College, 2012. Thank you to Professor Jamie King for her invaluable
guidance and constant encouragement.
1. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach
to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1138 (2003) [hereinafter A Multi-
Institutional Approach] ("Only by evaluating the relative competence of the various
institutions in performing the tasks required by the patent process can we hope to design a
system that works reasonably well-or, at a minimum, less imperfectly than the
alternatives."); NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1997) (arguing "comparative
institutional analysis" is essential to understanding law and public policy generally).
2. The Court "should, and to some extent does, consider the relative strengths and
weaknesses of these institutions to address the social issue involved. These institutions
differ from one another, and the force and implication of these differences vary from one
type of social issue to another." Neil K. Kosemar, Taking Institutions Seriously:
Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 366 (1984).
3. For instance while Congress has primary policymaking authority it delegates such
constitutional powers explicitly to executive agencies and implicitly to courts in drafting
vague and open-ended statutes. See A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1038.
Thus with any policymaking objective, conceivably any governmental branch is a "fit."
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advantage of a comparative institutional analysis lies in deciphering
this potentially "better fit."4
One of the U.S. patent system's policy objectives is to stir
innovation To encourage innovation, Section 101 of the Patent Act
defines patentable subject matter as "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof."6 Since enactment, responsibility for
interpreting and refining the appropriate balance between what is and
is not patentable has lied mostly with the courts.7 The U.S. Supreme
Court has delineated few restrictions to patentable subject matter
besides "natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea."" The
scope of patentable subject matter has continued to expand through
the granting of patents by the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(PTO), and review of those decisions by Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit).9 Consequently, the patent system
may no longer encourage innovation as Congress originally intended.
It is not easy to implement a public policy designed to encourage
innovation. With the patent system, the policy is increasingly complex
because not all innovations rely on patent incentives, and the net
social benefit or harm of patents remains unknown.' ° Additionally,
there is no institutional consensus as to what best drives innovation
amongst options like patents, antitrust law and research and
development funding." This inconclusive understanding of how
patents affect innovation has in part generated the current public
4. KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 49 ("An analysis based solely on goal choice can never
reach conclusions about law and public policy. Any institutionally sophisticated reader
confronted with a goals-based analysis.., can always offer a valid two-word response: 'So
what?"').
5. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than
'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.").
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
7. A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1037-38.
8. Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility-A Disease and a Cure, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. 387, 392 (2011) (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229-30 (2010)).
9. A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1038-40.
10. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Innovation Dynamics, and Dynamic-Elasticity Tests for
the Promotion of Progress, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 47, 48-50 (2010); Yu supra note 8, at
393-94 ("In fact, it still remains unclear whether patents as a whole provide a net social
benefit or harm.").
11. Art K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1271 (2012) [hereinafter Patent Validity].
[Vol. 4:2
Summer 2012] GENE PATENTS AND INNOVATION POLICY 359
policy debate concerning gene patents. 2 Gene patents are a
consequence of the general expansion of patentable subject matter.
How gene patents affect innovation in part spawned Association for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (hereinafter
generally referred to as the Myriad litigation).'3
Although there is no clear answer as to how best to achieve
genetic and biotechnology innovation, the Myriad litigation stands to
change the patent system's current approach." For now, claims to
genes that are markedly different from molecules that exist in nature
are patentable.'5 This broad description of patentability as it applies
to genes poses specific policy problems because unlike other chemical
products, the discovery of a gene related to a disease or condition is
the only gateway for developing diagnostic techniques and medical
procedures; the research and development has only begun as it
pertains to the specific patented gene.'6 A patent for another purified
chemical product is less likely to discourage innovation because the
12. Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology in the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ.
L. REV. 441, 442 (2004). See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99
(1998).
13. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad 1), 702
F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), overruled in part by Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v.
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I1), 653 F.3d 1329, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 11-725, 2012 WL986819 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
14. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 4,
Myriad I, 653 F.3d 1329, 2010 WL 4853320 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("If this judgment is not
reversed, and the important incentives of the patent laws not restored to these critical
inventive activities, valuable future developments will slow or cease, or be driven
underground so that their developers can maintain trade-secret protection without
disclosing them.").
15. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1351 ("We conclude that the challenged claims are drawn
to patentable subject matter because the claims cover molecules that are markedly
different-have a distinctive chemical identity and nature-from molecules that exist in
nature."); see also Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001)
(describing an "isolated and purified DNA molecule" as a "chemical compound[]" and
therefore patentable "subject to satisfying the other criteria for patentability"); Td. at
1092-96 (noting that extracted genes are eligible for patenting if they demonstrate some
credible utility); REP. OF THE SEC'Y's ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND
Soc', GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT
ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 12 (2010) [hereinafter SEC'Y's GENE PATENTS REP.],
available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS-patents-report_20OO.pdf.
16. SEC'Y'S GENE PATENTS REP., supra note 15, at 15 ("It is generally difficult if not
impossible to 'invent around' patent claims on genes and associations.").
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patent itself is an end product, but a gene patent likely has much
more of a chilling effect on future innovation.
Due to the tremendous implications to both the biotechnology
marketplace and innovation policy more broadly, the Myriad
litigation has drawn an unprecedented response-public outcry, mass
media and the attention of other institutions." The culmination of a
public policy dilemma within a multi-institutional system invites an
institutional choice analysis to determine how best to proceed.
In this Note, I will explore the issue of gene patents through the
lens of the Myriad litigation and argue that a change in institutional
course is required to narrow patentable subject matter pertaining to
DNA. Part I will examine the current state of the U.S. patent system,
including a description of the applicable institutional actors. Part II
will provide an overview of the Myriad litigation, including the case's
background and the public and institutional responses to the matter.
Part III will analyze the evolving institutional structures in light of the
Myriad litigation and other recent patent decisions, and consider how
best to fill-in the gap and protect previous reliance and investments
incurred in the past while also promoting future innovation. Finally, I
will conclude that while this sort of multi-institutional involvement
may be the response needed to remedy the patent system, there are
reasons to proceed cautiously, and more importantly, that perhaps it
is time to focus attention on institutions other than the courts.19
17. Yu, supra note 8, at 411-12.
18. See Patent Validity, supra note 11, at 1240-41. Rai identifies the interests and
influence of other institutions by quoting the following from the amicus brief filed by the
DOJ:
The extent to which basic discoveries in genetics may be patented is a question of
great importance to the national economy, to medical science, and to the public
health. This appeal consequently implicates the expertise and responsibilities of a
wide array of federal agencies and components, including the [PTO], the
National Institutes of Health .... the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Office of Science
and Technology Policy, and the National Economic Council, among others.
Id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 1,
Myriad It, 653 F.3d 1329 (No. 2010-1406)); see also John Schwartz, Cancer Patients
Challenge the Patenting of a Gene, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/05/l3lhealth/13patent.html?_r=l.
19. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2, 56 (2008) [hereinafter Fixing Innovation Policy]
(proposing a new agency to be housed in the Executive, the Office of Innovation Policy, to
address technological innovation and economic growth policies).
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II. Patent Law: The Institutional Framework
The U.S. Patent system stems from a constitutional delegation of
power to Congress: "To Promote the Progress of Science..., by
securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective ... Discoveries. "2° Under this grant of power,
Congress enacted the Patent Act, which defines patentable subject
matter as "any new useful art, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter, or any new useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent .... ,,21 The PTO, an executive agency, interprets the Patent Act
and exists to grant and deny patent applications. 2  The judiciary
reviews patent appeals from the PTO and other claims involving
patents. The Federal Circuit operates as a specialized federal court of
appeals, reviewing all patent appeals from the PTO and federal
district courts.23 The Supreme Court has discretionary appellate
jurisdiction over the Federal Circuit. Interspersed within this
institutional system, other executive agencies like the National
Institute of Health (NIH), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
the International Trade Commission (ITC) provide structural support
in either incentivizing innovation or protecting the products of that
innovation." These institutions advise the President and Congress on
issues pertaining to patents, innovation and commerce.26 Lastly,
Congress can amend the Patent Act, reform the structure and
purpose of the executive agencies, and redefine and/or redistribute
the judiciary's subject-matter jurisdiction. 27 This seemingly cohesive
and organized institutional framework has failed to keep pace with
20. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
22. Fixing Innovation Policy, supra note 19, at 47.
23. See generally Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or
Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559 (2006) (reviewing ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT? (2004));
John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for Appellate
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 664 (2009).
24. Golden, supra note 23, at 664-65.
25. See generally Fixing Innovation Policy, supra note 19, at 4-5, 20, 23-24, 59
(discussing the various agencies and their role in developing innovation policy in relation
to patent law).
26. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY at 1, 14 (Oct. 2003), 2003
WL 22507757 (suggesting legislative reform changes to improve the patent system, and
noting the FTC will file amicus briefs in appropriate circumstances).
27. See generally A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1128-31.
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gene patents and their affect on innovation policy objectives. 28 The
Federal Circuit's interaction with other institutions has been a
decisive contributing factor to the existing state of patent law.29
The Patent Act provides a broad designation of patentable
subject matter, and the Supreme Court has furthered its scope,
extending patentability "to anything under the sun made by man."30
Nonetheless, the Court had previously set forth relevant holdings
pertaining to patentable subject matter, holdings binding on the
Federal Circuit.3 For instance, in Diamond v. Diehr the Supreme
Court appeared to require a substance over form analysis for
patentable subject matter, noting a patent claim satisfies § 101's
requirements when after consideration of the claim as a whole, the
claim "is performing a function which the patent laws were designed
to protect. 32 More clearly, "[p]henomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are
not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work."33 Further, absolute limits, "[h]e who discovers a
hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly
of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a
discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a
new and useful end., 34 Although the Supreme Court has not provided
a rigorous standard, it has laid down a doctrine incorporating
substantive based standards into patentable subject matter, barriers
largely abandoned by the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit is a relatively new institutional player. In
1982, with the intent of establishing an expert court to stabilize
28. Yu, supra note 8, at 391-93.
29. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 473-76 (2011) (arguing that
the boundaries of patentability have been expanded over time because of the
asymmetrical relationship between the PTO and the Federal Circuit).
30. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see also Yu, supra note 8, at
395-96 ("The statute, however, provides much less constraint than it may first appear.
Under the current broad interpretation of § 101, a 'process' can mean any series of steps
providing a human benefit, a 'manufacture' or 'composition of matter' can include any
materials that offer some 'new and useful' properties .....
31. See Yu, supra note 8, at 418-22.
32. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981); Yu,supra note 8, at 419 n.160.
33. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,67 (1972).
34. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
35. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543, nn.19-20 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The Supreme Court
has not been clear"; "[t]he Supreme Court has not set forth, however, any consistent or
clear explanation"; "the understandable struggle that the [Supreme] Court was having in
articulating a rule.").
national patent law, Congress established the Federal Circuit and
provided it with exclusive jurisdiction over federal patent appeals. 6
Upon inception of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court became
less willing to grant certiorari in patent cases.37 The reluctance of the
Supreme Court to review patent cases in combination with the fact
that Congress had failed to enact and meaningful patent policy since
1952 seemingly shifted responsibility for updating and maintaining a
coherent patent policy to the Federal Circuit.38
The Federal Circuit has not performed accordingly, and has
instead rarely considered broader policy implications in its adherence
to a formal application of the Patent Act's text.3 9 In State Street Bank
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, the Federal Circuit
enunciated this textual approach determining Congress's intent based
on the text of § 101.' Despite the Supreme Court's emphasis in
J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., of the "the
forward looking perspective" of § 101,41 the Federal Circuit adheres to
a plain language approach.4 ' The Federal Circuit's formalistic
approach, also demonstrated by its unwillingness to consider larger
policy issues, 43 has in part contributed to the expansion of scope of
36. Clarissa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PENN.
L. REV. 1965, 1969 (2009) (citing ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION
AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To DO ABOUT IT 98-107 (2004)); see also Paul D.
Carrington & Paulina Orchard, The Federal Circuit: A Model for Reform? 78 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 575, 576-77 (2010).
37. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 387, 387-89 (2001) (noting the Supreme Court's withdraw from patent law
since the creation of the Federal Circuit).
38. See generally Long, supra note 36, at 1969; Masur, supra note 29, at 472.
39. A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1 at 1037.
40. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("The repetitive use of the expansive term 'any' in § 101 shows Congress's intent not
to place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be obtained beyond
those specifically recited in § 101 . .. [t]hus, it is improper to read limitations into § 101.").
41. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135 (2001).
42. A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1119.
43. Id. at 1119-20; Burk, supra note 12, at 441-42 (noting the Federal Circuit's
"beautiful, very internally consistent, very precise framework" does not "work with the
innovation profile of the biotechnology industry, and probably does not provide the
necessary incentives for innovation in the biotechnology industry."); Dan L. Burk & Mark
A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1579 (2003)
("Unfortunately, while the patent statute leaves ample room for courts to consider the
needs of particular industries, the Federal Circuit has proven somewhat reluctant to
embrace its role in setting patent policy. Not only has it proven unwilling to pay much
attention to the empirical evidence about innovation, but it has also taken a number of
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patentable subject matter.44 Moreover, while the Federal Circuit's
institutional approach affects patent law directly, its position within
the patent system influences how other institutions consider patent
policy.
45
One justification for the Federal Circuit's binding and uniform
precedent for all circuits is its relative expertise and technical
knowledge of patents compared to other courts.46 Yet despite having
a few judges technically trained, and technical staff assistance, the
court is not an expert in every area of science or technology from
which patent disputes may arise." In contrast, the PTO has many
more technically trained patent examiners in diverse fields of
technology. 4s Despite the PTO's apparent expertise advantage, it has
little patent authority, but much responsibility.49
Unlike other executive agencies, the PTO is without substantive
rulemaking authority and is thus a weaker institution for developing
steps toward eliminating the flexible standards of the patent common law in favor of
bright-line rules.); A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1121 (noting that
meaningful development of economic innovation policy by the Federal Circuit requires
explicit discussion of policy by the court).
44. A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1119-20. But see Larry D.
Thompson, Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-
Vornado Through Deference, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 533 (2004) (arguing the Federal Circuit has
successfully made patent law more uniform and accurate, and has strengthened patent
rights).
45. See A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1121 ("[I]nferior
decisionmakers such as lower courts and the PTO will be constrained in their
decisionmaking on patentable subject matter."); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy,
Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1623 (2007)
(noting how the Federal Circuit was intended to bring uniformity in patent law, but how
this uniformity discourages parties from challenging the Federal Circuit's decisions, and
also limits the set of available authorities and experience from which the court might seek
guidance). But see Masur, supra, note 29, 473 (noting that the PTO continues to grant
patents that are invalid under existing Federal Circuit law).
46. Golden, supra note 23, at 667; A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at
1068, n.148 ("Judges Linn, Gajarsa, Newman, and Lourie have technical backgrounds.").
47. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and
Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1094, n.220 (2007); Doug
Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 45,46-48 (2007).
48. A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1068 (noting in the area of
biotechnology the PTO has over 150 Ph.Ds); see also Lichtman & Lemley supra note 47,
at 47 (noting "the reality is that PTO expertise is brought to bear under such poor
conditions that any advantages associated with expertise are overwhelmed by
disadvantages associated with insufficient funding and inadequate outsider information.").
49. See generally Patent Validity, supra note 11, at 1238.
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and implementing public policy. ° For example, although the PTO's
Utility Examination Guidelines provide for an inventor's discovery of
a gene to be the basis for a patent claim on an isolated and purified
genetic composition," courts do not formally defer to such
guidelines.52 In addition to a weak policymaking status, a pro-patent
bias plagues the PTO.53 Patent examiners face tremendous pressure to
grant, rather than, deny patent applications.54 Further, the PTO's
financial well-being is dependent upon patent application fees, a
dependency that contributes to a mentality of seeing applicants as
",customers."55
The asymmetrical institutional interaction between the PTO and
the Federal Circuit perpetuates this patent epidemic. 6  Both
institutions appear to take pro-patent positions,57  and neither
sufficiently checks the other-in fact, the Federal Circuit's deference
to the PTO may vary depending on whether the PTO has granted or
denied the patent at issue.58 Additionally, unlike other administrative
law contexts, the Federal Circuit does not defer to the PTO's fact-
finding.59 The result is an area of law without an institution
responsible for updating public policy-the PTO has no such
50. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting
because the Patent Act "does not grant the Commissioner the authority to issue
substantive rules," "the rule of controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply"
(emphasis omitted)); see also Lichtman & Lemley, supra, note 47, at 60, n.45; Long, supra
note 36, at 1979-83.
51. 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093, 1094 (2001). See generally A Multi-Institutional
Approach, supra note 1, at 1132 ("[T]he PTO has for many years issued guidelines offering
evolving interpretations of various elements of the patent statute. In the last several years,
for example, it has promulgated for public comment, and subsequently issued, important
guidelines on the patentability requirements of utility and written description.").
52. Patent Validity, supra note 11, at 1272-73, 1280-81 (noting that PTO guidelines
are not entitled to Chevron deference but that courts could defer under Skidmore).
53. A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1175.
54. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U.L. REV. 1495,
1496, n.3 (2001) (noting time pressures, and that examiners must explain their reasons for
denying a patent, but for granting a patent application).
55. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patent Monopoly, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1541, 1562 (2009) ("Considering that the PTO frequently refers to patent seekers
as its 'customers,' there is a danger that the PTO will cater to these customers rather than
to the broader public.").
56. See, e.g., Masur, supra note 29, 496-502.
57. Id. at 505.
58. See generally Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1415, 1440-41 (1995).
59. A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1041.
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authority, the Federal Circuit will not consider the matter, and
Congress is unable or unwilling to act.
Supreme Court review provides an easy fix in some isolated
matters, but without an institutional overhaul, the asymmetry will
continue to expand patentable subject matter in other technological
and innovative areas. 60 Once seemingly reticent, recently the Supreme
Court appears more willing to consider patent cases.61 It remains
unclear, however, how increased Supreme Court patent law review
will affect the system's overall institutional arrangement and the
resulting policy.62
III. Myriad: A Call for Institutional Change
The ongoing Myriad litigation concerns the patentability of
isolated DNA containing all or portions of the breast cancer
susceptibility genes-BRCA1 and BRCA2 (collectively referred to as
"BRCA1/2"). 6 In 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
and the Public Patent Foundation (PUBPAT) filed the lawsuit on
behalf of a plaintiff coalition consisting of women patients,
researchers, genetic counselors, breast cancer and women's health
groups, and scientific associations representing geneticists,
60. Masur, supra note 29, at 531 (concluding "[t]he patent system's dysfunction is a
consequence of the relationship between the PTO and Federal Circuit" and thus
"policymakers should seek institutional remedies to what is fundamentally an institutional
problem.").
61. See Golden, supra note 23, at 658 ("[T]he Supreme Court has, in the past six
years, asserted its dominion over patent law with frequency and force."); Patent Validity,
supra note 11, at 1238, 1245, n.29; AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE IN PATENT LAW 1 n.2 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RL33923.pdf ("The Supreme Court Justices' apparent newfound interest in patent
cases perhaps stems from a recognition of the growing importance of intellectual property
to the nation's information-based economy, as well as a desire to correct perceived errors
in lower courts' interpretation and application of patent law.").
62. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 23, at 686-93; Fixing Innovation Policy, supra note
19, at 18 ("It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will provide a permanent
safeguard against the tendency of the Federal Circuit to favor patents and to view patents
as an exception to ordinary legal rules.").
63. This Note's focus is exclusively to the patentability of isolated DNA, and not to
plaintiffs' challenge to the patentability of related method claims for identifying a
predisposition to breast or ovarian cancer. Myriad 1, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181. The district court
held that the method claims were unpatentable abstract mental processes. Id. at 232-38.
The Federal Circuit upheld the district court's order as to all but one of the method claims.
Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1357-58. The ongoing appeal has raised jurisdictional issues, id. at
1343-48, which this Note will not examine.
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pathologists, and laboratory professionals. 6 The complaint challenged
the patents on both statutory and constitutional grounds in alleging
that the patents stifled medical research and diagnostic testing,
limited health care access and violated basic bioethics.65 Thus far, the
strategic attack to the practice of granting patents to isolated DNA,
on constitutional grounds, has been unsuccessful, 66 but the statutory
issue of patentable subject matter remains unresolved.67
In resolving the Myriad litigation, the judiciary has already been
influenced by an analysis concerning the role of other institutional
actors in the patent system and the relative policy capabilities of each
of these institutions.' The district court decision noted congressional
inaction did not preclude judicial review of gene patents,69 and the
Federal Circuit identified the PTO's longstanding practice of issuing
patents directed at DNA molecules and that a decision upsetting the
settled expectations of the inventing community must come from
Congress and not the courts.7" More recently, in Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (Prometheus), the Supreme
Court noted that the Court's bright-line prohibition against patenting
laws of nature was necessary in part because of the court's limited
ability to distinguish between laws of nature.71 Notably, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) submitted an amicus curiae brief
arguing for the court to make such a distinction: claims to isolated
genes, without more, are unpatentable, while claims to isolated genes,
64. ACLU Challenges Patents on Breast Cancer Genes: BRCA, ACLU (Feb. 22,
2012), https://www.aclu.org/free-speech-womens-rights/aclu-challenges-patents-breast-
cancer-genes-0; Brief for Appellants at 10-11, Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329 2010 WL 4600106
(Fed. Cir. 2011), (describing the two categories of the twenty plaintiffs: (1) those with no
alleged communication with Myriad Genetics but whom were actively recruited by the
ACLU to join the case and who allege they were ready and willing to engage in research
and clinical practice involving the BRCAI/2 genes, and (2) those who had previously
communicated with Myriad Genetics about the BRCAI/2 gene patents).
65. Complaint at 1-3, Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d, 181 No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2009 WL
1343027 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). For a general perspective on the problems of gene patents see
Michael Crichton, Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.13, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
02/13/opinion/13crichton.html (discussing how gene patents stymie innovation because
they can be used to block further research, and hurt patient care).
66. Myriad 1, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 237-38.
67. Order Granting Cert. and Vacating Judgment, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 11-725,2012 U.S. LEXIS 2356 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
68. See KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 49.
69. Myriad 1,702 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
70. Myriad 11, 653 F.3d at 1354-55.
71. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., No. 10-1150 (Mar. 20,
2012).
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further altered or manipulated, are patentable.72 The litigation has
inspired both a multi-institutional awareness and response, which
could culminate in a dramatic policy change concerning the
patentability of genes. The success of any such resolution, however,
depends on the appropriateness of the Myriad litigation to serve as
the basis for change.73
A. The Face of Myriad
With the help of NIH scientists, Myriad sequenced the BRCA
1/2 genes, and filed related patent claims to the genes, mutations of
those genes and associated diagnostic tests.74 Myriad wanted to
become a leading biopharmaceutical diagnostic company and because
the BRCA1/2 mutations provide an important link in the global battle
against breast cancer (an individual with these mutations has a risk of
40-85% of developing breast cancer, compared to the general
population's 12.7% lifetime risk), Myriad was off to a great start.75
Strategic business decisions quickly undermined Myriad's chances of
earning a reputation for providing quality genetic testing, as Myriad
instead gained notoriety for leveraging its patents to secure a profit
by eliminating any competitors in the BRCA1/2 testing field.76 After
receiving its patents in 1998, Myriad sent cease-and-desist letters to
competing laboratories.77 Myriad was ill equipped for its public fall-
out, and it failed to recognize differences between its genetic patent
business strategies and that of other competing biopharmaceutical
companies.8 Although, patent claims cover almost twenty percent of
72. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 4, 9-
10, 18, Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 2010 WL 4853320 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("We acknowledge
that this conclusion is contrary to the longstanding practice of the Patent and Trademark
Office, as well as the practice of the National Institutes of Health and other government
agencies that have in the past sought and obtained patents for isolated genomic DNA. The
district court's judgment in this case, however, prompted the United States to reevaluate
the relationship between such patents and the settled principle under Supreme Court
precedent that the patent laws do not extend to products of nature.").
73. Robert Cook-Deegan, The Overstated Case, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE
GENETICS, http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/GeneWatch/GeneWatchPage.
aspx?pageld=299 (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
74. See generally E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the
Policy Storm, 12 GENETICS IN MEDICINE 39, 40-41 (April 2010).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 41-43.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 44.
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all human genes, unlike Myriad, most of these patent holders do not
fully reserve the exclusivity rights to themselves. 9
In addition to the exclusivity matter, Myriad's patent claims also
produced a large number of sympathetic potential plaintiffs-women
with a family history of breast cancer.' ° Diagnostic BRCA1/2 testing
allows an individual to determine whether they have the mutation
and from there decide whether preventive/prophylactic procedures
are in order. 1 Myriad's diagnostic test remained prohibitively
expensive and out of reach for many individuals; worse, the test had
quality issues despite its high cost.82 In sum, it seems likely breast
cancer's extremely high public profile, in combination with Myriad's
clear intent to monopolize and control its potentially life-saving
BRCA 1/2 genetic tests, instigated a public reaction that resulted in
litigation.83
B. The District Court's Decision
On March 29, 2010, the district court granted plaintiffs' summary
judgment motion invalidating seven of Myriad's BRCA 1/2 gene
patent claims.4 The court found the information content and
conveyance of the genetic code, and not the presence or absence of
chromosomal proteins, to be DNA's distinguishing feature. 5
Therefore, since purification and isolation removes proteins but
leaves the DNA information content intact, the court held that the
isolated DNA did not constitute patentable subject matter because
the isolation process did not render the claims "markedly different"
79. Id. at 43-45.
80. Complaint at 3-13, Myriad 1, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, (No. 09 Civ. 4515), 2009 WL
1343027 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
81. National Cancer Institute, BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/risk/brca (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
82. Steve Benowitz, French Challenge to BRCAI Patent Underlies European
Discontent, J. NAT'L CANCER INST., 80-81 (Jan. 16, 2002) , available at
http://jnci.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/94/2/80 (noting "Myriad's test misses some
10%-20% of the expected BRCA1 mutations...").
83. For an analysis of the negative media attention, see Timothy Caulfield, Tania
Bubela, & C.J. Murdoch, Myriad and the Mass Media: The Covering of a Gene Patent
Controversy, 9 GENETICS IN MED. 850, 853 (2007) (tracing the media coverage of the
Myriad controversy and finding that the majority of the articles, 77.6% had a negative
tenor concerning Myriad).
84. Myriad 1,702 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
85. Id. at 227, 229-30; Andrew Pollack, After Patent on Genes is Invalidated, Taking
Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/business/31gene.
html.
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from the naturally occurring sequence.86 In so ruling, the court
rejected the argument that purification and isolation is necessary to
unleash DNA's utility research value.87 This monumental patent
decision disrupted the patent status quo and has far ranging
implications for patents, research and development, and health care.'
The district court order redrew the lines of patentable subject and
narrowed its scope.89 That order, however, did not conclude the
matter. Myriad appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.
C. The Federal Circuit's Decision
The contentious appeal resulted in the Federal Circuit reversing
the district court on the patentability of the BRCA1/2 genes. First
turning to the composition claims, the court reversed the district court
in holding that the claims to the BRCA1/2 genes "are drawn to
patentable subject matter because the claims cover molecules that are
markedly different-have distinctive chemical identity and nature-
from molecules that exist in nature." The court found that the human
intervention required to "chemically cleave[]" the claimed DNA
sequence produced an isolated DNA molecule of "a distinct chemical
entity" and "not a purified form of a natural material."' Judge
86. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 232 ("Because the claimed isolated DNA is not
markedly different from native DNA as it exists in nature, it constitutes unpatentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.").
87. The court found the nucleotide sequence itself "the defining characteristic of
isolated DNA that will always be required to prove sequence-specific targeting and
protein coding ability that allows isolated DNA to be used for various applications." Id.
The court dismissed Myriad's argument that with current technology, a nucleotide
sequence's utility value is unleashed only after DNA purification and/or isolation-
separating the specific nucleotide sequence from other proteins and sequences-as only a
"technological limitation" to the use of DNA. Id. at 231-32. Additionally, in relying on the
Court's holding in Funk Brothers, here the court found Myriad's identification of the
chromosomes that correlated with breast cancer and ovarian cancer and the isolation of
these sequences was also "a discovery of the handiwork of nature-the natural effect of
certain mutations in a particular segment of the human genome." Id. at 232 ("And like the
aggregation of bacteria in Funk Brothers, the isolation of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA,
while requiring technical skill and considerable labor, was simply the application of the
techniques well-known to those skilled in the art."). Further, the court found Myriad's
patent claims not "markedly different" from naturally-occurring sequences since the
cDNAs are a result of the naturally occurring splicing of pre-mRNA into mature mRNA.
Id. at 231-32.
88. See John Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Judge Invalidates Human Gene Patent,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/201O/03/30business/30gene.html.
89. John Conley & Dan Vorhaus, Pigs Fly: Federal Court Invalidates Myriad's Patent
Claims, GENOMICS LAW REPORT, Mar. 30, 2010, http://www.genomicslawreport.com/
index.php/2010/03/30/pigs-fly-federal-court-invalidates-myriads-patent-claims/.
90. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1352.
[Vol. 4:2
Lourie, writing for the majority, noted the PTO's longstanding
practice of issuing patents to isolated genes, and that the Supreme
Court's repeated advice that "changes to longstanding practice should
come from Congress, not the courts."9'
In a concurring opinion, Judge Moore determined that the
isolated human genes were patentable but under a different analysis.
Judge Moore read Supreme Court precedent as requiring an analysis
into whether the isolated DNA "have markedly different
characteristics with the potential for significant utility, e.g., an
'enlargement of the range of ... utility' as compared to nature."92 In
distinguishing between the DNA claims to isolated full natural length
gene sequence and the claims to the isolated cDNA molecules, Judge
Moore concluded that the later could be used as a basis for probes
and thus had a new utility, but that the full-length strains had no
significant new utility compared to the natural form. In light of this
determination, Judge Moore still found that both types of isolated
DNA claims fit within the parameters of patentable subject matter
because of the settled expectations of the biotechnology industry, the
PTO's longstanding practice of granting patents to these claims, and
the need for courts to defer to Congress.93
Dissenting, Judge Bryson found that the mere extraction of
BRCA1/2 was not sufficient to render the isolated molecules
"markedly different" from native DNA.94 Elaborating, he found that
the isolated BRCA1/2 genes were identical to native DNA in that
"they have the same sequences, code for the same proteins, and they
represent the same units of heredity."95
The Federal Circuit's decision marked a victory for Myriad and
the biotechnology industry regarding the patentability of isolated
human genes. The ACLU petitioned the Federal Circuit to review the
decision, contending that the court erred in "fail[ing] to considered
whether the DNA fragments claimed in these patents are products of
nature."96 In September 2011, the Federal Circuit denied the petition
91. Id. at 1354-55.
92. Id. at 1361 (Moore, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1367-68; see also id. at 1373 ("we cannot, after decades of patents and
judicial precedent, now call human DNA fruit from a poisonous tree, and punish those
inquisitive enough to investigate, isolate and patent it.").
94. Id. at 1376-78 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1376 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
96. Kevin E. Noonan, Plaintiff(s) File Petition for Rehearing in AMP v. USPTO-
Update, PATENT DOCS, Aug. 29, 2011, http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/08/plaintiffs-file-
petition-for-rehearing-in-amp-v-uspto-update.html.
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for rehearing.97 On December 7, 2011, the ACLU filed a petition for
writ of certiorari.98
IV. Institutional Responses
As expected, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
decision regarding the patentability of isolated human genes. The
decision exemplified the Federal Circuit's institutional position of
deference to the PTO 9 a position masked within a holding describing
the complex scientific technology at issue. The decision forwent any
possibility of finding a compromise on the issue or taking a middle
ground policy approach to the issue of patentable subject matter. For
example, the court could have considered that isolation plus
additional modification and/or alteration renders a claim patentable
subject matter as an eligible composition of matter. Instead, the Court
held that both cDNA and full-length isolated DNA is patentable.'00
As the concurring opinion notes, the Federal Circuit has the
institutional capacity to make such compromising decisions-it
understands the science. 0' And, importantly, any patent law
institutional decision maker must understand the science and
technical processes involved in biotechnology.'0 2 Thus, the Federal
Circuit's patent law approach may demonstrate the failings of the
patent system's institutional design-no institution designated to both
deal with the science and consider important public policy.
A resolution purporting to provide broad patent policy reform
(especially with a retroactive application) may promote appropriate
goals. In a matter involving private rights and rapidly advancing
scientific technology, however, it may be equally critical to have an
97. Kevin E. Noonan, Federal Circuit Denies Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing in AMP
v. USPTO, PATENT DOCS, Sept. 14, 2011, http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/09/federal-
circuit-denies-plaintiffs-petition-for-rehearing-in-amp-v-uspto.html.
98. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, No. 11-
725, 2011 WL 6257250 (Dec. 7, 2011).
99. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1352.
100. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9, 14,
Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 2010 WL 4853320 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (arguing isolated DNA
without further modification or alteration does not constitute patentable subject matter
while isolated DNA that has been further modified is patentable).
101. See, e.g., Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1361 (Moore, J., concurring (nothing the
majority's "thoughtful analysis of the scientific principles" and emphasizing additional
chemical considerations that are applicable to the issue).
102. See, e.g., A Multi-Institutional Approach, supra note 1, at 1069 (noting how the
Federal Circuit's refusal to defer to the PTO's fact finding in biotechnology despite its lack
of expertise "has yielded some questionable jurisprudence.").
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institution equipped to weigh both the broad and the specific policy
matters surely to be affected by the decision. 3 The Myriad litigation
implicates universal innovation public policy concerns and individual
market-based concerns, thus the case provides a prime analytical
framework for an institutional comparison.' 4 Reforming public policy
and resolving a sui generis conflict may present problems that the
courts are likely ill equipped to remedy effectively in the same case.
A. The Current Multi-Institutional Response
The federal government's involvement in the appeal has been
unprecedented. Unexpectedly, the DOJ filed an amicus brief with the
Federal Circuit.' 5 The brief contradicted the PTO's longstanding
policy of granting patent claims to isolated human genes in arguing
that claims to isolated genes-without more-are unpatentable, while
claims to isolated genes-further altered or manipulated-are
patentable.' °6 Moreover, in addition to filing an amicus brief, the
Solicitor General argued before the Federal Circuit)' 7 In total, the
United States' involvement and position, taken contrary to that of the
PTO, demonstrate the overwhelming policy implications of the
case. L~
Further, while it remains unclear whether the Supreme Court
itself will eventually review the decision, the Supreme Court did grant
103. Nard & Duffy, supra note 45, at 1624 ("[T]he Federal Circuit and patent law
would benefit from exposure to an ongoing, lively jurisprudential debate at the circuit
level... [a] decentralized decisionmaking model fosters a strategy focused on incremental
innovation and competition, while also providing the additional benefit of 'teeing up' cases
more clearly for Supreme Court review...").
104. See generally KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 17-28.
105. See Andrew Pollack, U.S. Says Genes Should Not be Eligible for Patents, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/30/business/30drug.html.
106. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 4, 9-
10, 18 ("We acknowledge that this conclusion is contrary to the longstanding practice of
the Patent and Trademark Office, as well as the practice of the National Institutes of
Health and other government agencies that have in the past sought and obtained patents
for isolated genomic DNA. The district court's judgment in this case, however, prompted
the United States to reevaluate the relationship between such patents and the settled
principle under Supreme Court precedent that the patent laws do not extend to products
of nature.").
107. Letter from Neal Katyal, Acting Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, to
Jan Horbaly, Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Feb. 10,
2011), available at http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/katyal-letter.pdf; see also Courtenay
C. Brinckerhoff, Solicitor General asks to argue Myriad on April 4, LEXOLOGY, Feb. 17,
2011, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a6210238-10f9-4d71-aca4-8ee7684
989ba.
108. Patent Validity, supra note 11, at 1240-41.
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the petition for writ of certiorari, vacating the Federal Circuit's
judgment and remanding to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration in
light of Prometheus. That decision follows the Supreme Court's
109
relatively recent practice of increasingly deciding patent cases -
including a pattern of remanding to the Federal Circuit and then
eventually reversing the court-a practice that may eventually come
into play again depending on the Federal Circuit's handling of the
Myriad litigation on remand.
On March 20, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its Prometheus
decision holding that a method claim to a medical test that relies on
correlations between drug dosages and treatment was not
patentable."' In writing for the majority, Justice Breyer concluded,
"the patent claims at issue here are effectively the underlying laws of
nature themselves. Those claims are consequently invalid.""' In so
ruling, the Court went on to comment on public policy, specifically
patent law's purpose to further research and innovation."' Moreover,
the Court responded to the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Myriad that
the court should not disrupt companies' IP rights to human genes,
given the PTO's longstanding policy of granting such patents. In
Prometheus, the Court concluded that it is not up to the court to
weigh different groups' interests: "[w]e need not determine here
whether, from a policy perspective, increased protection for
discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.""3
Additionally, in Prometheus the Court noted that its role in the
patent system is to apply patent law so as not to discourage
innovation and that it accomplishes this with a bright-line rule
prohibiting the patentability of laws of nature. 4 Prescribing methods
to encourage innovation and experimenting with laws of nature is the
responsibility of more policy inclined institutions, as the Court noted,
''we must recognize the role of Congress in crafting more finely
tailored rules where necessary.""' 5  The Court identified its
institutional weakness in distinguishing among different laws of
109. See infra note 60.
110. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., No. 10-1150 (Mar. 20,
2012).
111. Id. at slip op. 28.
112. Id. at slip op. 20 ("The court has repeatedly emphasized ... that patent law not
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of the laws of nature.").
113. Id. at slip op. 28.
114. Id. at slip op. 20.
115. Id. at slip op. 28.
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nature and noted that it must rely on this bright-line rule prohibition
against patenting laws of nature."'6 Since the Supreme Court is not
likely to draw a finely crafted lines influenced by policy objectives,
Supreme Court review may not effect desired patent policy change-
it may instead provide only an overcorrection to the Federal Circuit's
previous expansion of patentable subject matter. Not discouraging
innovation is not the same objective as encouraging innovation. Thus,
another institution is likely necessary to provide the mechanism for
fulfilling the goal of patent law.
The Federal Circuit will again have the opportunity to review the
issue of gene patents. Whether it adopts a rationale while affirming its
judgment, or goes along with Prometheus reasoning remains
unclear-but either option seems far from ideal. In the area of patent
law, the courts best institutional response may be to apply bright-line
rules-but such a rigid institutional approach points to the need for
other institutions to play a part and help strike the appropriate policy
balance regarding gene patents."l 7
Another related response occurred in early 2011 in the Senate
chambers when the Senate passed the America Invents Act, one of
the first major patent reform measures to pass either house since
1952.118 Although the bill does not make any specific policy changes to
address the Myriad litigation, several of its provisions address PTO
management issues, which probably contributed to the case. 9
Foremost, it outlines procedures for which the PTO can alter its fees
and provides for a more extensive notice and comment procedure for
116. Id. at slip. op. 24 ("In any event, our cases have not distinguished among different
laws of nature according to whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently
narrow. And this is understandable. Courts and judges are not institutionally well suited to
making the kinds of judgments needed to distinguish among different laws of nature. And
so the cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature,
mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more easily administered
proxy for the underlying 'building-block' concern.") (citation omitted).
117. Masur, supra note 29, at 519-20 (noting how other institutions could be an
effective check to the asymmetrical interaction between the PTO and the Federal Circuit).
118. The United States' position in the appeal fits with the government's broader
technological innovation policies as demonstrated by the most recent budget proposals.
See Donald Zuhn, President's Budget Proposal Increases Funding for Basic Research But
Seeks to "Trim" Data Exclusivity Period and Pay-for-Delay Agreements, PATENT DOCS
(Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/02/presidents-budget-proposal-increases-
funding-for-basic-research-but-seeks-to-trim-data-exclusivity-p.html; see also Masur, supra
note 29, at 520 ("For its part, Congress has largely been absent .... "); Long, supra note
36, at 1968.
119. America Invents Act, S. 23, 112th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8, 2011).
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any rules the PTO seeks to adopt. ° Although short of granting the
PTO full substantive rulemaking authority (like Chevron deference
for the agency's interpretation of the Patent Act) the measure is a
step towards strengthening the PTO, which could result in balancing
the patent system and establishing a more symmetrical interaction
between the PTO and the Federal Circuit.12" ' This bill complements
the PTO's own "2010-2015 Strategic Plan" and the President's
Economic Innovation plan, which specifically addresses strengthening
intellectual property rights. 2
Additionally, while the success of any of these policy positions is
far from clear, and may even be unlikely, this multi-institutional
response is quite unlike the institutional cohesion regarding patents
just a few years ago. Whether this response is a result of the Myriad
litigation, the nation's economic crisis, or biotechnology development
and expansion, the institutional analysis must continue with future
policy discussions.
B. Previous Institutional Efforts
The under-utilization of previous institutional reform
mechanisms is perhaps an indication of the futility of future reform.
Congress's 2000 amendment to the Bayh-Dole Act served in part to
prevent any research obstacle in the context of private ownership
rights premised in part on federal grant money. 3 Importantly, the
government now maintains 'march-in' rights by which it can limit a
patent holder's rights in this area by granting licenses. 4 This
legislative achievement displayed Congress' role in achieving
information sharing and innovation policy objectives. Yet, despite
Congress' willingness to take a stance on this issue, the delegation of
the institutional responsibility has not proved to be successful.25
120. Id. at § 9.
121. See generally Masur, supra note 29, at 530-31; Long, supra note 36, at 1968-72.
122. The White House, A Strategy for American Innovation - Promote Market-Based
Innovation (2011), available at http://www.slideshare.net/whitehouse/a-strategy-for-
american-innovation-promote-marketbased-innovation; USPTO Strategic Plan 2010-2015
(2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/USPTO 2010-2015_Strategic_
Plan.pdf.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
124. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2006).
125. The NIH has codified four limited circumstances in which it will use its 'march-in'
rights: 1) when the patent holder is not expected to achieve practical application of the
subject inventions within a reasonable timeframe; 2) when necessary to satisfy health or
safety needs not being met by the grantee; 3) when necessary to meet requirements for
public use that are not being reasonably satisfied; and 4) when necessary to provide
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While the Bayh-Dole Act seemingly provides an obvious remedy
to the stifling of innovation caused by gene patents, the NIH has
never exercised its 'march-in' power.'26 The General Accounting
Office and officials within the NIH consider 'march-in' rights a
burdensome and time-consuming process.'27 Although agencies may
not enthusiastically invoke the 'march-in' provision, it is a process
exclusively available to agencies, and it is a tool intended to address
the very problem at issue-patent claims tying up further research
and development."" Instead of actually enforcing the right, agencies
could instead conceivably threaten to use the 'march-in rights', which
could compel grantees to license their inventions without having to
undergo the full-on burdensome process. 29 Similar to the Federal
Circuit's purported institutional malfeasance, in the expansion of
patentable subject matter,' 30 agencies' reluctance to utilize their
institutional tools may suggest a poor institutional organization and
ineffective tools, both of which further plague the patent system.
Comprehensive and successful legislative reform by Congress
also seems unlikely. On February 9, 2007, Representative Xaviar
Becerra (D-CA) introduced H.R. 977 titled "Genomic Research and
Accessibility Act" which proposed to prohibit the patenting of human
genetic material. 3' The proposal received little traction.32 Becerra's
preference for U.S. industry. 37 C.F.R. § 401.140) (2011); see also SEC'Y'S GENE PATENTS
REP., supra note 15, at 98.
126. Stifling or Stimulating-The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, I10th Cong. 36 (2007) (statement of Dr. Marc Grodman, Chair of
the Board and CEO, Bio-Reference Laboratories); see also Christopher M. Holman,
Recent Legislative Proposals Aimed at the Perceived Problem of Gene Patents, A.B.A. SEC.
BIOTECH. 4-5 (2008), http://www.abanet.org/scitech/biotech/pdfs/recent-legislative-chris_
holman.pdf. For the NIH not exercising its march-in petitions, see SEC'Y'S GENE PATENTS
REP., supra note 15, at 74; John Conley, Government Refuses to March-In Under Bayh-
Dole-Again, GENOMiCs LAW REPORT, Jan. 18, 2011, http://www.genomicslawreport.com/
index.php/2011/0l/18/government-refuses-to-march-in-under-bayh-dole-again/.
127. SEC'Y'S GENE PATENTS REP., supra note 15, at 75.
128. Art K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Process of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 293 (2003).
129. Id. at n.35.
130. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 128, at 290. ("The Federal Circuit has further
extended the Supreme Court's expansive approach to patent eligibility while relaxing the
stringency of standards for patent protection ... that might otherwise have prevented the
patenting of incremental advances in upstream biomedical research. The Federal Circuit's
generally supportive attitude towards patents has encouraged imaginative claiming
strategies and unprecedented levels of patenting activity.").
131. H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (as introduced Feb. 9, 2007). This piece of legislation was
very similar as another bill that Rep. Becerra introduced unsuccessfully in 2002. The
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bill sought to provide a mechanism for Congress, the Judiciary and
the Executive Branch to ensure continuing advancement in the life
sciences.' It also provided an exemption from infringement liability
when verifying genetic testing results."M
V. Proceeding Cautiously
Addressing innovation and the institutional failures of the patent
system is a laudable policy objective; however, using the Myriad
litigation to redraw patentable subject matter lines and reform the
multi-institutional patent system may be the wrong first step. The
case's underlying facts reveal the controversy's relative uniqueness-
a uniqueness potentially not replicable. Additionally, although the
PTO and the Federal Circuit have not adequately updated the scope
patentability concerning new technologies, both institutions have
contributed to a continuing modernization of the patent system.
One remedy to the previous expansion of patentable subject matter
under Federal Circuit purview is the Supreme Court's increased
willingness to review Federal Circuit patent decisions36 and to
consider public policy. 37 This self-correcting institutional mechanism,
however, may not be a cure to this country's innovation policy
138
concerns.
To implement an appropriate institutional remedy, the
institutional problem must first be identified. Aimless institutional
policy reform may only serve to aggravate existing problems.9 With
Genomic Research Accessibility Act, H.R. 3967 107th Cong. (as introduced Mar. 14,
2002).
132. But see Holman, supra note 126, at 3-6.
133. H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (as introduced Feb. 9,2007).
134. Id.
135. See generally Masur, supra note 29, at 477-78 (noting the expansion of the
patentable subject matter by the PTO and the Federal Circuit).
136. See, e.g., Fixing Innovation Policy, supra note 19, at 18 ("[T]he system's 'pro-
patent' tendencies have recently been mitigated through Supreme Court intervention in
several important cases.").
137. Prometheus, slip op. at 23; see also id. at 28 ("We need not determine here
whether, from a policy perspective, increased protection for discoveries of diagnostic laws
of nature is desirable.").
138. See generally Golden, supra note 23, at 673-74 (arguing that the as a generalist
court, the Supreme Court may have little to offer in the area of substantive patent law, but
that the Court could disrupt the body of legal doctrine under centralized Federal Circuit
review that is otherwise unlikely to ever change).
139. "If one does not know whether a system 'as a whole' (in contrast to certain
features of it) is good or bad, the safest 'policy conclusion' is to 'muddle through'-either
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the Myriad litigation, it is critical to determine if the problem is
Myriad or the general patentability of isolated DNA? If the latter,
then it might be appropriate to engage in a multi-faceted and planned
institutional response to implement a remedy. If the first-why risk
transforming the system on a case that is not likely to be repeated?
Myriad's actions quite likely threatened patent innovation goals, but
what is the likelihood that another biotechnology company would
follow Myriad's example?'" Rigorously enforcing patents and
thwarting further research and development comes at the high cost of
public fallout 4' and is thus probably not a sound business approach.
Other biotechnology companies may prefer to engage in effective
licensing and research sharing to being sued by the ACLU.42 On the
other hand, judicial led policy reform is dependent upon a case or
controversy, a court has no power without a conflict in which third
parties are willing to litigate.'43 Thus, if such a challenge to the
patentability of isolated human genes is not likely to reoccur then
perhaps the courts should not forego the opportunity to implement
some needed change.'"
On the other hand, a defective court ruling remains effective
unless and until a party fronts the threshold costs of litigation and
appeal. 145 Further, if an appellate court makes the erroneous ruling, it
would remain binding on lower courts until reversed by a higher
reviewing court. This can be a very slow route to effect reform. 46 For
with it, if one has long lived with it, or without it, if one has lived without it." Liza
Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. REV.
501, 539, n.121 (2010) (quoting STUDY OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
& COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC
REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958)).
140. Id.
141. See Caulfield, supra note 83, at 853.
142. See, e.g., Gold & Carbone, supra note 74, at 62-64.
143. See generally John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value
or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
32-33 (2009).
144. KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 150.
145. Andrew B. Coan, Is There a Constitutional Right to Select the Genes of One's
Offspring?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 272-73 (2011) (comparing the initial threshold costs of
litigation with the costs associated with lobbying for political change).
146. Burk, supra note 12, at 450 ("The court is also disadvantaged because it takes
time for cases to percolate up from the district courts. The delay may prevent the Federal
Circuit from adapting the doctrine to current industry needs.").
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all of these reasons, judicial policymaking in an area of rapidly
advancing technology is formidable.'47 As Justice Holmes noted:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping
the law of the future, but because of some accident of
immediate interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts
the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of
hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law
will bend. 48
In addition to innovation policy interests, public concern for
medical care access and the ethical dilemma of patenting life
underlies the Myriad litigation. Courts are likely ill equipped to
construct a decision successfully responding to these diverse interests.
In a multi-institutional system, there are many potential institutional
options for policy reform, and so the focus-on both one case and on
institution-is likely misplaced.
VI. Conclusion
Despite the outcry regarding the patentability of human DNA,
there remains no clear route to effect public policy change. There are
many institutions capable of assisting in this challenge, and the
response generated in the Myriad litigation demonstrates that a new
level of cooperation and effective executive management along with
enhanced Supreme Court review may prove effective. In the
meantime, any court decision will likely be either over-inclusive or
under-inclusive regarding the patentability of DNA. Other
institutions must pick up the slack and help provide for the
implementation of a policy that encourages innovation, protects
investments, and provides for public access to the latest medical
technologies.
147. Vertinsky, supra note 139, at 513-14 ("The complexity and rapid change of
technology markets impose timing problems-laws need to be able to adapt to the pace
and nature of technological change.").
148. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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